

Education Reform Support

Volume Four:
Tools and Techniques

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Education Reform Support

Volume Four:
Tools and Techniques

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Office of Sustainable Development
Bureau for Africa
U.S. Agency for International Development

Preface

In 1995, the United States Agency for International Development's (USAID's) Bureau for Africa published a report titled *Basic Education in Africa: USAID's Approach to Sustainable Reform in the 1990s.* That technical paper examined Agency experience in education in Africa in the late 1980s and early 1990s and drew out several lessons for how USAID could better approach the design, implementation, and evaluation of programs supporting education reform. One of those lessons concerned the role of information and policy dialogue in improving policy formulation and implementation in the education sector. This series, Education Reform Support, is the product of the Africa Bureau's two years of effort to pursue the operational implications of that lesson.

Neither information use nor dialogue is a new idea. USAID and other donors have years of experience supporting education management information systems. Likewise, the development community has grown quite fond of the term "policy dialogue." What Education Reform Support set out to do was to distill the best knowledge about information and dialogue, to examine the development field's experience in these areas, and to systematically apply that knowledge and experience to articulating a new approach.

This new approach, however, is not really new. Financial analysis, budget projection, planning models, political mapping, social marketing, and the techniques of stakeholder consultation and dialogue facilitation have long been available for use in education projects. These tools and techniques, however, have not been systematically organized into an approach.

Similarly, arguments abound for participation and for better—or more informed—decision making. The Education Reform Support series depicts realistically what those terms mean. Further, Education Reform Support identifies how capacity can be built within countries for broader, more effective stakeholder participation at the policy level, and, how that participation itself can contribute to better informing the policy process.

There is an ultimate irony to education. Good schools and good teaching can be found in any education system, sometimes under very adverse conditions. The problem is that they cannot be found everywhere. The challenge confronted in supporting education reform is exactly that: how to help good practice occur on a larger scale.

The inability of education systems to adapt and spread innovation is a result of poor policy and management environments. The policy environment is deficient for political as well as technical reasons. In most countries, the education of children is an issue of direct and personal concern to all sectors of the population, as well as to a number of large interest groups; as a result, education reform is a delicate and highly charged political force field.

To wade into the politics of reform we must focus on understanding the political economy of reform in the countries in which we work: Who are the key stakeholders (both potential gainers and losers) in a given reform direction? What are their strengths, depth and breadth of influence, and points of vulnerability? What are the characteristics of local institutions, groups, and individuals who might be able to play critical roles of influence and dialogue facilitation as well as analytical and technical support to the reform effort, over the long haul? And, most importantly, how can we design reform assistance that attenuates stakeholder tensions and exploits stakeholder alliances, vulnerabilities, and strengths, to the advantage of positive and sustainable movement toward reform overall?

Education Reform Support creates an operational framework through which education programs and projects can organize the techniques of information, analysis, dialogue, and communication into a strategic package. The objective of that package is to help improve a country's capacity to formulate education policy and implement reform. It does so by applying these techniques in order to

- recognize and counterbalance the political interests that accompany reform,
- build the capacity of diverse actors to participate in the policy process,
- reassert and redefine the role of information in policy making, and
- create networks and coalitions that can sustain the dialogue and learning that are essential to educational development.

The Africa Bureau believes this series will prove valuable in helping education officers in USAID and other organizations design projects that take into account the knowledge and lessons gained to better support education reform. The Bureau also feels that the Education Reform Support approach will help governments, ministries of education, and other interested actors better shape their contributions to the difficult process of negotiating and managing education reform.

Julie Owen-Rea
Office of Sustainable Development
Division of Human Resources and Democracy

Foreword to the Education Reform Support (ERS) Series

This series of documents presents an integrated approach to supporting education reform efforts in developing countries, with particular emphasis on Africa. It is intended largely to specify how a collaborating external agent can help strategic elements within a host country steer events toward coherent, demand-driven, and sustainable educational reform. Additionally, this series of documents may help host country reform proponents understand the aims and means of donors who propose certain activities in this area. We hope that host country officials, particularly in reform-minded, public-interest nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society organizations, find this series of documents both an inspiration and a guide for coherently proposing and articulating undertakings to donors, using the donors' own vocabulary of reform and modernization.

Several key premises and motivations underlie ERS. First, the major *binding* constraint to successful educational development in poor countries is neither the need to transfer more funds nor a lack of educational technology and know-how. That is, we contend that in most instances, countries can make sufficient progress by better using whatever internal or external funds and pedagogical technology already exist, but that in order to so, they need far-reaching modifications in the way they approach both policy formation and system-wide management.

Second, policy-analysis inputs (such as information systems, databases, and models; training in public policy and cost-benefit analysis; training in management, budgeting, and planning; and so forth) into policy reform and management improvements, while necessary, are not sufficient. The constraints to policy improvement are ideological, attitudinal, affective, and political-economic as much as—if not more than—they are analytical or cognitive in origin.

Third, as a means of pressing for the attitudinal and political changes needed for reform, donor leverage of various kinds is largely insufficient and inappropriate. The pressure has to come from within (i.e., it must be both indigenous and permanent), which means that until powerful national groups are mobilized and have the means at their disposal to exert positive policy pressure, little will happen in the way of thoughtful reform.

Our approach aims, therefore, to integrate traditional public policy analysis (using known information and analytical techniques) with public policy dialogue, advocacy, awareness, and political salesmanship, and to build indigenous institutional capacity that can strategically use this integration for purposes of effecting purposeful education reform.

The above suggests that in order to support processes of education reform, a donor would need a rather flexible and sophisticated approach—so flexible that it would verge on a nonapproach, and would simply rely on the difficult-to-articulate wisdom of individual implementors. Yet, to define activities in a way that renders them "fundable" by donors and intelligible within the community whose efforts would support these activities, one obviously needs to have some sort of system—some way of laying out procedures, tools, and steps that can be used in this messy process. As a way of systematizing both lessons learned and certain tools and techniques, we have developed Education Reform Support (ERS).

A long-winded but precise definition of Education Reform Support is: ERS is an operational framework for developing policy-analytical and policy-dialectical abilities, and institutional capacities, leading to demand-driven, sustainable, indigenous education policy reform. The purpose is to ensure that education policies, procedures, and institutions empower the system to define, develop, and implement reforms that foster relevant and meaningful learning for all children.

There are both operational and technical dimensions to ERS. With regard to the former, we have developed steps one might take in an ERS project. First, there are processes, procedures, operational guidelines for designing a project in ERS. Second, there are the same aspects to running such projects. Aside from the operational and institutional "how-to's," we provide a set of guidelines on the tools, techniques, analytical approaches, etc., that can motivate and generate reform movements, as well as assisting in managing the ongoing reform in a modernized or reformed sector.

The ERS series is organized in the following manner. Volume 1 offers an overview of the entire ERS series. It also contains the ERS series bibliography and a guide to some of the jargon that is found throughout the series. In Volume 2, we introduce the problem, and establish the justification and basis to the approach in terms of past donor activities in the sector, and its critiques from both "left" and "right" perspectives. This volume also sets out some of the main lessons learned that establish a basis for the procedures and strategies described in the following volumes. An operational perspective on how to support reform activities is presented in Volume 3. It discusses both the institutional frameworks that reformers can seek to support or help coalesce if they are only incipient, and some likely ideas for sequences of activities. Volume 4 lists and discusses in considerable depth the specific analytical and communication tools and techniques that can be employed. It also places these tools and techniques in the context of past and ongoing donor activities in areas which have in the past used these tools and techniques disparately and unselfconsciously.

Having provided in Volumes 2-4 both the basic intellectual underpinning as to what might be done and how to proceed technically, sequentially, and institutionally, Volume 5 assumes that reformers, particularly donors, might be interested in designing an intervention of considerable size. Therefore, it lays out in detail the specific design steps one might wish to undertake to ensure a healthy start to a major level of support to an ERS process. Finally, Volume 6 presents ideas for how to monitor and evaluate a typical ERS intervention.

In addition to the volumes, the ERS series includes three supplemental documents: *Policy Issues in Education Reform in Africa, Education Management Information Systems (EMIS) for Accountability,* and *Strategies for Stakeholder Participation.* An ERS Course Description is also a part of this series. This course description provides guidelines for teaching almost any ERS-relevant course (e.g., education planning, EMIS, policy modeling) within a larger ERS construct. It also details the provision of a core set of ERS skills.

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Section 1

Introduction and Context

In the second volume in this series (*Foundations of Education Reform Support*), we have laid the foundations for why donors and counterparts may need some new ways to look at the support of indigenous educational reform processes, and we have listed the main empirical lessons learned about what might and might not work in providing such support. In Volume 3 (*A Framework for Making it Happen*), we have also explained, in operational and institutional terms, what steps might be taken and what "how to's" should be considered, in order to develop project-worthy and fundable activities.[1]

In this volume we systematically lay out the technical and institutional tools that can support the processes of initiating and motivating reform, as well as supporting sectors or ministries that are modernizing and are hence involved in a continuous process of updating and improving the education system.

By tying together the operational issues as discussed in other volumes, and the technical approaches discussed here, a donor and counterparts can describe projects of assistance. How this can be done is detailed in Volume 5, *Strategy Development and Project Design*. Here we simply focus on the tools donors can extend to counterparts.

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[1] An additional framework for considering the promotion of broad stakeholder involvement in the policy reform process is presented in the companion volume *Strategies for Stakeholder Participation*.

Section 2

An Overview of the Education Reform Support "Tool Kit"

In the broadest terms, Education Reform Support (ERS) is a process of using and transferring both technical and institutional abilities. To fully describe it, then, means (1) explaining the set of technical and institutional abilities as part of a "tool kit," as well as (2) explaining the processes whereby the tools are strategically put to work in a dynamic, constantly changing institutional context. In earlier volumes we focus largely on institutional processes. In this volume we focus directly on the tools and techniques.

As stressed in Section 2.6 of Volume 3, the operational expression of Education Reform Support consists of nurturing national institutional capacity for engaging in reform support activities (what we have called building a reform support infrastructure). We define two broad areas of reform support activities: (1) generating demand for change, counteracting resistance to reform, and creating enabling conditions ("clearing space"); and (2) promoting, analyzing, and documenting innovation ("filling space"). To accomplish these ends, ERS uses the standard techniques and frameworks of decision support and the public policy sciences, with strong emphasis on data, analysis, and what we term policy communication. Given the problems in the public sector of developing countries, particularly in the education sector, we have added "institutional development" and "networking" as techniques to be extended and developed.

Box 1 below shows a list of most of the techniques involved in ERS. This is a fairly standard list. Many references exist on these items, documented even down to the manual and textbook level. For example, standard methodologies exist for EMIS, analytical tools such as cost analysis and enrollment projections, etc. We discuss them further in Section 4 of this volume, citing many of the standard references for the most well-documented sets of tools. We then devote significant attention to the policy communication set of tools (which we believe to be less well understood in this particular context and application).

Box 1. Some Tools and Techniques for Education Reform Support

- **Data and information**
  - Education management information systems (EMIS) for accountability and dialogue
  - Survey research and census needs assessment, for analysis and public discussion

- **Analytical approaches**
  - Internal efficiency analysis
  - External efficiency analysis
  - Budgeting and financial analysis
  - Analysis of financial transfers and school funding
  - Simulation, projection, and planning models
  - Analysis of salary scales and cost implications
  - Analysis of governance options

- **Communications**
  - Policy dialogue
  - Policy marketing
  - Social marketing
  - Advocacy
  - Negotiation and mediation
  - Public communication campaigns
  - Political-economic discourse

- **Institutional development for analysis, communications, and advocacy**
  - Networking and coalition building
  - Funding of public interest or advocacy groups
  - Strategic planning for public sector and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in policy development and policy advocacy
  - Environmental mapping/scanning
  - Organizational capacity building
  - Technology transfer

None of the tools on the above list is new. We stake no claim to having invented any specific tools. What we have done is examined fairly precisely how these tools can be applied in the framework we call Education Reform Support. For example:

- Information and persuasive communication are means for taking on the obstacles to reform. Policy marketing, advocacy, and dialogue are the specific tools that can be applied to overcome obstacles and generate effective demand for change. Sound information and analysis are the currency of that marketing, advocacy, or dialogue. (Box 2 summarizes how these techniques are being applied in Mali.)

- If reform can be described as creating or replicating the conditions that enable innovation to take place, then the nature of the relationship between enabling conditions and innovation needs to be documented, analyzed, and publicized. Analytical and advocacy tools can be used to draw system-wide implications from “space filling” activities, and dialogue about how to create those conditions on a large scale (and the implications of doing so) can be facilitated.

- The environment in which education reform takes place is complex, and the process of reform is inherently nonlinear, unpredictable, and messy. In undertaking analysis, advocacy, or dialogue, one is intervening in the political economy of the sector with the expressed intent of changing it. Therefore the nature of the environment will change and the reform support strategy will need to evolve in response to that change. Everyone involved will need

Box 2. Use of Information and Dialogue in Mali to Overcome Obstacles to Reform

The *Programme décennal du développement de l'éducation* (PRODEC) is an effort to elaborate a sectoral policy framework and long-term development strategy for education in Mali. This effort is being spearheaded by a team of Malians who are gathering information, conducting analysis, and facilitating a deliberative process—all intended to feed into a sectoral policy framework and investment plan. One task taken on by the Malian team (which has been functioning essentially as a "reform support infrastructure core group") is to diffuse some of the likely opposition to sector-wide reform.

Past efforts at education reform in Mali have been strongly resisted by two powerful constituencies: the university students' union and the teachers' unions. In an effort to avoid confrontation and to engage these important actors (and other stakeholder groups) in the development of the sectoral policy, a stakeholder workshop was recently held in Bamako. During the workshop, information from a broad-based beneficiary assessment, from some quantitative analysis of the education system (its present and projected status) and from some analytical studies of various technical policy options was used as the basis for facilitated stakeholder dialogue.

The workshop successfully used objective information and structured interaction as a means to diffuse ideological and political posturing. Stakeholders were actively engaged, working together in small groups to assess information and interpret its implications for sectoral policy. The head of one of the teachers' unions best summed up the success of the workshop when he stated, "We opposed the *NEF* [the government's previous reform effort] because we were not consulted or included in its elaboration. This workshop demonstrates that the current reform effort is taking a different approach and we pledge our support to helping shape the sectoral policy." This was said after there had been both discussion of the need to redeploy teachers and open consideration of such reforms as decentralized hiring and firing.

to use tools such as strategic planning and strategic management, as well as systems of monitoring and assessment.

Several aspects of the ERS approach go beyond the standard list in Box 1. For example, ERS places the tools in the context of policy change, and the role of information in that process. We suggest that most activities supporting policy analysis in the developing world have focused too exclusively on such lists, leading to supply-driven attempts to improve the use of knowledge and information in the education sector. Most of these have achieved low levels of demand for analysis, and hence low sustainability of the analytical, information, and communications systems developed.

Our point of departure is that as messy as Education Reform Support (or support of education reform) appears to be, it must nevertheless be systematized if donors are to play a helpful role. This is true because of the simple fact that these activities have to be defined, organized, and funded, but before they can be, leaders must have plans and guidelines that are as clear and implementable as possible.

As we have stated elsewhere, our systematization uses concepts from political science and political economy as to how the policy process actually happens; concepts from decision support theory as to how to aid decision processes with good, accessible information; concepts from extension and other technical propagation functions; and information and concepts from social and policy marketing as a means of communication and mutual stakeholder education.[2] All of this borrowed knowledge is informed, of course, in the specific case of education reform in Africa, by a knowledge of what the reform issues are, and what appropriate analytical tools and institutional processes can be brought to bear in helping define the reform parameters. All of these aspects need to be systematically integrated, and need to be given some form of institutional expression. (Again, we raise the notion of reform support infrastructure.) In the rest of this volume, we first discuss the "system" aspects, and then we take the system components one by one and discuss them in some detail.

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[2] To help clarify certain terms from these fields as we use them in this series, we created Annex A, "Some Jargon," that appears in Volume 1.

Section 3

Toward a Systematization of Lessons Learned and Technical Approaches: Education Reform Support

3.1 Systematization vs. Implementation

How can one draw all the lessons learned in policy support into some kind of system that allows a donor to plan assistance in this area? We do not wish to engage in systematization for its own sake, for two reasons. First, proponents of reform in various sectors worldwide already have developed some satisfactory systems, and we should build upon them rather than proposing new alternatives. Building on is both less expensive and less confusing. Second, we believe—to paraphrase Einstein—that in many situations, "some theory is a highly practical thing." To sum up: We are interested in some systematization because it is practical. However, we also intend to avoid reinventing wheels when the ones that already exist will work perfectly well for our purposes.

We propose to use the frameworks and ideas explicit or implicit in the literature on processes of policy change, particularly the literature that emphasizes how information is often used in such processes. (For example, see Altman and Petkus 1994; Goldsmith 1983; Haddad and Demsky 1994; Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier 1993a,1993b; Porter 1995; Sabatier 1991; Sabatier, Hunter, and McLaughlin 1987; Saboteur and Pelkey 1987; Weiss 1995; and White 1990a, 1990b.) However, we do not intend to repeat theories of *how* the policy process happens. We concentrate only on the specific aspects of this process that are amenable to projects worthy of systematic donor support to definable activities, with a particular emphasis on the role of information, analysis, and dialogue. Thus, for example, we focus on the aspects that Haddad and Demsky (1994) call "formulation," "evaluation," "adoption," and "assessing impact." Our purpose is simply to make such points of assistance intelligible to both donors and counterparts, in order to help them design support activities. In this sense, we also base our arguments on key experiences such as those in Burkina Faso, described in the "third cycle" of the study presented in Haddad and Demsky (1994); in Ghana, in Hartwell (1994); in South Africa, in Healey (1994a); and in Mauritius, in Selwyn (1995). We emphasize to a large degree the role that analysis, information, and "marketing" or dialogue functions can play in supporting policy change, within an overall context of networking and institutionalizing the host-country expression of these functions. Readers also may induce the process from the literature on decision support systems,[3] in particular the classical data-analysis-dialogue paradigm (the technical aspects). We emphasize that the data-analysis-dialogue paradigm must be construed nonlinearly as informed by the politics of the process, and we add to that paradigm explicit support to institutional development in the areas of information, analysis, marketing, dialogue, and networking between institutions (the institutional aspects).

We are quite aware that this focus appears to slight the implementation aspect, but we note two issues in this respect, as follows.

3.1.1 Existing Literature on Implementation

There is a burgeoning, excellent, and eminently practical literature on this topic that is already available through donor projects (e.g., USAID’s Implementing Policy Change [IPC] project and related literature, as in Brinkerhoff 1994, 1995; Brinkerhoff and Kulibaba 1994; Crosby 1992a, 1992b, 1992c, 1995; IPC 1995a, 1995b), which we cannot possibly hope to better. We heartily endorse this literature and propose that any activities resulting from this writing use these readings, approaches, and individuals (or those trained by them) extensively. These materials are referenced in the ERS Course Design.

3.1.2 Implementation vs. Design

We believe there is strong evidence to support the view that in many cases, what appear to be implementation problems are in fact problems with unrealistic design. They arise when those who would implement participate insufficiently in the design, as documented in, for example, Craig (1990), Haddad and Demsky (1994), Psacharopoulos (1990), and Selwyn (1995). Many reform programs read like a proposal for landing astronauts on the sun by 1997, and the subsequent critiques often blame faulty implementation for the fact that no one could find a landing vehicle capable of withstanding thousands of degrees centigrade. As Drucker (1995) has remarked, part of the task of re-invention and reform is not simply to apply plenty of “managerese,” but to jettison impractical or undoable tasks, whose impracticality is a matter more of overall market relevance, design, evaluation, and recognition of the basic implementation limits of the state, than of developing better implementation plans and follow-through processes. True and addressable implementation problems are, then, those that surface when design has been good, in that it has taken into account the deep limitations to public activity and human perfection in each particular context, by letting those who are closest to the problem co-design the relevant aspects of their own reforms and then implement them. The trick is to make reforms self-implementing to greater and greater degrees. Some analysts of development processes (e.g., Rondinelli 1993) have suggested that "good" implementation of reform processes is really not that different from good design of such processes, since the reform needs to be designed in such a way that its constant redesign is built into the routine. For addressing these "true" implementation problems, which are usually due to lack of technique for process management, the literature and resources such as those available through the IPC and IPC II project (as mentioned above) are excellent, and there is little sense in us duplicating them.

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[3] See, for example, Crouch, forthcoming; Feldman 1989; Henderson and Schilling 1985; Lu, Giu, and Guimaraes 1988; Sprague and Carlson 1982.

For both of these reasons (availability elsewhere of excellent implementation literature, importance of redesign even during implementation), we concentrate below on the tools relevant to decision support: data and information, analysis, and dialogue (including advocacy and consensus building), rather than on straight implementation aspects.

3.2 Comments on Systematization

A few preliminary comments regarding systematization are relevant here.

3.2.1 The Value of the System

First, one cannot take the word "system" lightly. For Education Reform Support to work correctly, the three technical aspects (data, analysis, and dialogue) must be institutionally integrated into a fully linked *system* in which information flows fast and efficiently among the components of the system, and in which the leaders of each component are totally aware of which of their outputs the other aspects use, how, and why. If the data component and the dialogue component are too far from each other bureaucratically and practically, and are only indirectly linked to the analytical arm, the system will not work very effectively. The leaders of the three units or areas of work have to see one another as each other's direct clients, if not as members of a single team. All this discussion about links applies whether we are talking about an explicit policy support team within, say, a ministry, or a networked reform support infrastructure that involves organizations in civil society and the state. In the latter case, there must be a core of technical and *strategic* leaders who somehow systematize the linkages among groups that specialize in information, groups that specialize in analysis, and groups that specialize in dissemination, dialogue, and advocacy; as well as groups specializing in training and institutional development for reform support.

Thus, within a single bureaucracy, a policy support system or team can depend on the minister's office, and can be grafted onto the existing structure of a ministry, but it must have direct access to the management information system (MIS) or data capacity of the government in general and particularly the education ministry. In addition, it must have access to the analytical capacity and the dialogue and public relations capacity, and it must be able to draw upon them. If the ministry cannot be easily reorganized so that the data, analysis, and dialoguing capacities are integrated, at least an integrated team that has ties to all units has to be formed and empowered. If a “project” in Education Reform Support is set up outside a ministry, say in a think-tank, it must nevertheless successfully integrate these three technical arms as well. In many cases it is also ideal if the nucleus of this reform support effort actually straddles the public and private sectors. Finally, if these functions are not successfully captured in a single group in civil society, then at least there has to be a group that is an extremely efficient broker among those with data, those with high analytical capacity, and those with the dialogue and marketing capacities. Without these capacities, the reform process will not be effectively supported. One cannot simply throw technical assistance in these areas at a society, and hope that somehow it will all come together.

3.2.2 Information and Analysis

Second, the flow among the aspects of the system is also critical to making it a real system, and above all to making it sustainable. This argument is partly related to some of our points in other volumes in this series regarding the demand for and true consumption of information and analysis. The point here is that information and energy cannot flow *from* the data aspect *to* the analysis (or policy design) aspect and thence to the dialogue or marketing aspect. As noted earlier, this supply-oriented approach to reform support has been the most common donor assumption, and sadly often does not work because it presupposes the demand and ultimate consumption. If the ultimate point is to create, or enrich, a marketplace of ideas, it should be obvious that injecting supply into a marketplace where there is no fixed, predetermined demand, will not result in more transactions. It may result (or, at least, this usually is the initial hope) in the same number of transactions having a lower cost than before, but it will not increase the number of transactions—it will not enrich the marketplace.

Thus, demand must flow from the dialogue side to the analysis side and from there to the data side. This demand cannot simply be assumed to exist, nor will supply create its own demand. Unlike in the traditional donor and technocratic model where the flow is from data systems to analysis and to decisions, and where the demand for rational public decisions is assumed, we believe the demand has to be bolstered, and that opening up the dialogue is a key component of demand-creation for analysis and data. This is true if the ultimate purpose is to improve public policy decision making, but it is true even if all a reformer wants to do is to ensure that our system works as a system—the links in the system have to be bi-directional; that is, information and energy have to flow both ways. In Table 1 below we have drawn arrows going up and down to represent this flow, and have placed dialogue and communication first in the table. In many cases, reformers will need to begin by bolstering the demand for analysis and data by creating informational disequilibria and anxiety through public discourse. Note that focusing on the demand side initially also helps define the *real* priority of different types of data.

3.2.3 Motivating vs. Implementing Reform: Skills Needed

A third aspect related to the systematization of ERS is the distinction between the types of functions and skills that are needed in (1) motivating reform, and (2) implementing reform or managing a reformed or reforming ministry. If we cross-classify these two aspects with the skills classification needed for the three technical areas of a policy support system (data or information, analysis or modeling, and dialogue or policy marketing), as well as the two institutional areas (development and networking), then we can begin to think where this system fits into a broader understanding of policy support. Table 1 illustrates the configuration of functions and skills that might exist in an Education Reform Support system. Obviously, the lines between various areas are porous. The table is meant to illustrate how the dialogue function fits into an overall design of activities and institutional loci that support policy reform or a reformed ministry.

Note that within the cells we refer simultaneously and somewhat indistinctly to types of activities and to the technical skills needed for those activities. Sometimes we also refer specifically to the duration of technical assistance needed to carry out the activity, but often the duration is implicit, or should be developed for particular countries by comparing the need for the skill with its availability in-country.

3.3 Examining the Conceptual Fit Among Approaches

Another way to understand the relationships among many of these approaches, and particularly to see how traditional approaches fit within the paradigm we are promoting, is Table 2. First, the columns represent tools or techniques used by the various disciplines (as listed in Box 1). They also can be thought of as referring to classical policy analysis or decision support categories (the “data, analysis, dialogue” paradigm). The rows represent, roughly, the size of audience (if we are talking about communications techniques), or the size of the universe or sample (if we are talking about research techniques) to which the technique applies.

Table 1. Technical and Institutional Areas Needed for Education Reform Support

	Broad function	
Technical and institutional “tools”	**Motivating**: can be an external (nongovernmental organization [NGO] or think-tank) function, or internal-external dialogue	**Sustaining and managing**: normally internal functions of ministry of education (MoE) or networked nongovernmental providers
Dialogue and communications ↓	■ Consensus-building on fundamental issues: staying focused in spite of the messiness of democratic processes ■ Workshop techniques ■ Policy marketing and social marketing ■ Use of policy and social marketing techniques such as graphics	■ Dissemination of information on results ■ Dissemination of information on how to get results: the MoE as an extension service, the sector as a learning organization
↑ Analysis ↓	■ Finance proposals ■ Cost projections ■ Relative efficiency of system	■ Monitoring and evaluation, statistical analysis, design of pilot tests, controlling for self-selection bias, etc. ■ Decentralized and privatized features: targeting, formulae, etc. ■ Contract design and analysis, performance-based contracting ■ Human resource optimization, union relations, salary scales ■ Policy-oriented budgeting ■ Strategic and quantitative planning, cost projections, integration of projects in budgeting
↑ Data and education management information system (EMIS)	■ International comparison databases ■ External efficiency analysis, using Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS), social surveys ■ Internal efficiency using EMIS data ■ Secondary data from EMIS ■ Other secondary data from censuses	■ EMIS linkage to personnel, financial data; community monitoring; external dialogue ■ Standardized assessment linked to EMIS and input tracking ■ General indicators
Institutional capacity development	■ Funding or civil-society think-tanks in education reform, or for such projects in existing think-tanks; technical assistance (TA) in financial sustainability in longer term ■ TA in establishing marketplace of ideas, contracting norms ■ Development of a reform support infrastructure, straddling state and civil society; core group within such an infrastructure	■ Community organizing, training, and school management ■ Quality and school monitoring based on information, using quality result data and fundamental quality level (FQL) (input) data ■ Generic community-school interactions ■ Democratic but effective parent-teacher associations (PTAs), PTA-principal relations, community boards, etc. ■ Other well-known institutional capacity issues internal to MoE as traditional in education projects ■ Maintenance and sustenance of reform support infrastructure

(continued)

Table 1 (continued)

Technical and institutional "tools"	Broad function	
	Motivating: can be an external (nongovernmental organization [NGO] or think-tank) function, or internal-external dialogue	**Sustaining and managing**: normally internal functions of ministry of education (MoE) or networked nongovernmental providers
Networking[a]	■ Bringing disparate actors together, networking with NGOs, ministry of finance, ministry of planning ■ Political mapping techniques	■ Networking with local leaders, councils of mayors, ministry of interior or home affairs ■ Networking with ministries of finance, planning

[a] Obviously, there is great overlap between this segment and those above, particularly during the early stages.

Within the "space" created by the two dimensions—techniques and size of audience—we have placed the traditional disciplines as they may be applied to supporting education reform (or any other sectoral reform, for that matter).[4] Thus, traditional policy analysis, as applied in most developing countries to support sectoral reform, is in the upper left hand of the space: it focuses on data and analysis, and has traditionally eschewed communications efforts. During the 1970s to 1990s, donors spent large sums on policy analysis units placed in the respective sectoral ministries, in everything from agriculture to transport. Most engaged in modeling, analysis, operations research, etc., usually using secondary data or already-gathered MIS or survey and census data.

"Policy dialogue" is a related discipline or practice. It often draws on the results of analysis, or is somewhat analytical itself. It may not involve engaging in massive data work, and it does emphasize communications. Thus, this technique is to the right of policy analysis in the diagram. Since policy dialogue is, by definition, oriented at communication, it spills over into the communications column, but it stays to the left of "unidirectional" techniques (since that is more the province of advocacy), and it stays rather high in the rows, because dialogue is usually a one-on-one, or few-on-few, technique. Donors have also funded policy dialogue efforts. They typically have (1) been minimally analytical; (2) almost never used primary data, and often not even secondary data, but only taken on the analytical results produced by other policy analysis units; (3) emphasized theory and common sense; and (4) pursued dialogue and debate with parliaments, cabinets, important opinion makers, etc.

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[4] We do not claim that our definition of the domain of the traditional techniques is the only valid one. We do believe it is the one that most well-informed analysts and staffers in the donor community would think about.

Table 2. Location of EMIS, Policy Dialogue, Advocacy, Policy Analysis, and Social Marketing in the ERS Tools Spectrum



1	2	3 Communications		
		Type		
Information gathering; data collection and management	Research and analysis	a Bi-directional	b Uni-directional	Size of audience
Case studies	Simulations; statistical and econometric analysis; budgeting; planning; qualitative research; common-sense research	Policy dialogue; “boardroom” techniques; negotiation	Advocacy and policy marketing	Few
Focus groups		Focus groups		
Socioeconomic surveys				↕
EMIS and school statistics				
Consumer and attitude surveys	Market research		Social advertising, mass education campaigns	Many

Policy advocacy, on the other hand, makes even less use of massive data research, and sometimes is not analytical at all. Thus, it is placed more over to the right. Since most advocacy efforts are by definition aimed at leaders (even if grassroots leaders), the techniques used are often more one-on-one or few-on-few; thus, policy advocacy is “high” in the rows of the matrix.

Traditional EMIS projects usually are narrowly concerned with data management. These projects seldom address the analytical uses the data are put to, much less their communications and dialogue potential. (This situation is changing, of course, but here we are referring to the techniques as traditionally understood.)

Finally, traditional social marketing tools span the whole width of the matrix. Generally they are thought of as applying to mass market research, mass communications techniques, etc. To some degree, focus group research also is used. As a result, social marketing bulges up into the "small audience" area. The techniques have been used less frequently in policy reform. More often, they have been used to create or bolster demand for certain services, to explain policy decisions ex post facto, or to change *individual* behavior and practices through communications. We believe the potential for using marketing techniques in policy reform, e.g., to create demand for policy change, is great.

An obvious step in applying these techniques systematically and in an integrated way is to be aware of where they fit in the kind of spectrum we have just shown. But, in fact, the only practical way to apply these functions *as* a system may be to have them applied *by* a system. A system may consist of an EMIS arm, an analysis arm, a communications and presentations arm, and a negotiations and networking arm. Yet, to really make such groups work as systems means going beyond the supply capacity of each group, and toward effective demand from each group or part of the system upon the others. Internal demand, in turn, is derived from effective *external* demand.

As we have noted numerous times previously, most donor efforts concentrate on supply. As a result, they not only do not achieve sustainability, but also may not even achieve systematization, because informational flows are unidirectional, and hence are frequently not even effective in the short run.

We know of no developing country education sectors in which the three key components (data, analysis, communications) have been successfully integrated within a large donor project, particularly in the public sector. A relatively successful noneducation example would be the Fundación de Economía y Desarrollo in the Dominican Republic, which developed databases, both numerical and conceptual; applied solid analysis and commentary; and then developed intensely graphical communications campaigns that were used in newspapers and on television. The unit did all this systematically and persistently.

As we mention elsewhere, for effective demand signals to be transmitted with the system, the unit's directorship and technical levels must communicate well, as should the "outside" or "policy" levels, and the "inside" or "technical" levels in the institutions or networks of institutions.

Section 4

Discussion of Specific Components

4.1 Data and Information

Many of the technical issues relevant to two of the system's aspects—data and analysis—are almost sufficiently well-known for our purposes. For example, there is a good and still growing literature on the technical and institutional aspects of EMIS (Chapman 1990, Chapman and Dungana 1991, Chapman and Mählck 1991, Williams 1994, Windham 1993). For further references and more detailed discussion of data aspects from the perspective of Education Reform Support, see the ERS supplementary volume *Education Management Information Systems (EMIS) for Accountability*, and the bibliographies contained therein.

A summary "reform support" perspective on EMIS suggests that most past EMIS efforts—indeed, most work on the data and information aspect (the first column of Table 2 above)—can be characterized as part of the "development as technology supply" paradigm. At the risk of seeming repetitive, we again make the important point that the emphasis has been on hardware, software, technique, and institutional development. Furthermore, many EMIS efforts are only loosely tied to analytical efforts, which in turn are almost never tied to a real effort to take the results of analysis to the public policy arena via dialogue and policy marketing techniques. There is little "demand-pull" from public debate and public accountability to analysis and thence to data. The assumption is that the supply of computers and software and institutional development assistance will tend to result in better decisions, as would be the case if the demand for better decisions existed. A pious hope has often been expressed that as soon as decision makers see all the data that are becoming available, they will use them, but this is only a more convoluted way to express the hope that there is some underlying demand. Sometimes an effort is made to carry out an "information needs analysis," but even this effort assumes needs that can be articulated rationally and that are bureaucratically explicit, as opposed to being hypothetical laundry lists. Developing-country bureaucratic interlocutors *know* that donors expect them to express their information needs, and they know that in order to qualify for aid, they have to recite the fact that they need to make more rational decisions based on data.

Thus, the assumption has been that speaking or writing about need will in some way correspond not only to actual *use* of information, but also to sufficient moral and budgetary support to information units to make them sustainable. But most of these assumptions are unjustified, as evidenced by the lack of national support most of these efforts have received.[5] Most EMIS efforts are doomed to fail unless real, effective demand pre-exists—or, if the demand does not pre-exist, unless the environment at least is not actively or tacitly opposed to the existence of demand (e.g., in a highly closed political and economic system) *and* someone knows how to create demand and makes the effort to do so. Unless both these assumptions and requirements are met, most EMIS efforts will be quixotic, and very soon donors will be completely exhausted with funding EMIS.

Below we make some suggestions on how to use dialogue and public accountability pressure to create demand for data.

4.2 Analysis

Similarly, we need say little more in this context on statistical techniques, planning and forecasting models, economic analysis related to optimal education subsidies, the use of action research and participatory analysis, case studies, etc. Although we are greatly interested in such analytical work, and although technical expertise in these areas is required in the development of a real policy support system, outlining the requirements here would take us too far afield. Moreover, these techniques are fairly well known already via other donor documents such as Coombs and Hallak (1987), Mingat and Tan (1988), and UNESCO (1980) ("the Thonstadt manual"), as well as standard texts such as Monk (1990). The more innovative among such documents, at least in the education context, such as Baker and Grosh (1994), Winkler (1994), Winkler and Rounds (1993), and World Bank (1992), also deserve mention, because it is in this direction—beyond budgeting and into more financial analysis—that analytical tasks in a modernized education sector need to go (although the analysis need not take place *in* a ministry of education). Against the breadth and depth of knowledge that can be found in these resources, we make the following points.

First, as with EMIS, most donor assistance in analysis, as already described above, has suffered from the "supply-side" illusion, namely that supplying technique is key to inducing its use. Yet there has been little real demand that is intrinsic and endogenous to the society in question, because there has been little organized pressure for system change in the direction of rationalizing decision making. Little has been done to create or abet such demand, or to develop methods for assessing where the demand exists, so little is known about these things.

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[5] Other sectors—such as agriculture—went through this cycle about 15 years ahead of education. For example, by the late 1980s almost all data-oriented donor assistance in agricultural management had ceased, after the painful realization had sunk in that few of these efforts had been maintained.

Second, it is important to emphasize what we have said earlier: The analytical skills that are needed to *motivate* reform are different from those needed to manage a reformed sector. It is also important to note a few of the differences in analytical skills that are needed to manage in a traditional ministry and in a modernized one.

Most of the analytical skills needed to *motivate* reform are related to comparative analyses of efficiency and effectiveness, cost-benefit analysis, and so forth. These techniques are meant to make opinion and decision makers, including those concerned with economic growth and national security, feel appropriately insecure about the adequacy of their system. By highlighting and bringing out into the open the problems in the system, and by engaging such decision makers in some hard-hitting, widespread, and strategic dialogue, reformers can begin to generate a demand for change. But since no system is perfect and there are no standard ideals, most of the analysis of efficiency, quality, and so forth, needs to be comparative. The country in question can be compared to others with regard to access, equity, student scores in international comparative assessments, length of school year, etc. National comparisons that emphasize regional differences also are useful, as are comparisons over time where the data allow. Finally, comparisons can be made to other sectors with regard to both measured internal and external effectiveness and the logic of managerial decision making. (For instance, why does the education ministry think it can run the equivalent of 20,000 retail outlets—schools—effectively in a centralized manner, when everyone who actually has to be truly accountable for results sees such an approach as both politically undesirable and total folly?)

This kind of comparative analysis, however, is as urgent when the issue is managing and implementing a reformed system as it is when the issue is making technical suggestions for what the reforms should be. The analytical skills needed for implementation in traditional ministries need not be emphasized here—they relate mostly to traditional planning, forecasting, budgeting, site selection and location, etc. In a modernized ministry, however, a whole new set of skills becomes relevant, such as: (1) how to carry out finance in a decentralized context; (2) how to optimize on the trade-offs among excessive dependence on the center vs. equity distortions vs. fiscal responsibility; (3) how to write, monitor, and analyze contracts, particularly performance-based contracts for the privatization or delegation of certain services; (4) how to design and manage teacher pay systems that reward performance, but not in superficial and potentially deleterious ways; and (5) how to develop testing and assessment systems that evaluate the system as well as the student, and that are the basis for dialogue with communities regarding minimum standards or fundamental quality levels. These are only examples—an exhaustive list would take us too far afield. But it is important to emphasize that *these sorts of skills are lacking in most ministries*.

Planning, forecasting, and budgeting skills of the traditional variety, which are needed to "plan" a traditional ministry, are lower-order skills while at the same time being scarce. The more difficult skills highlighted here are even scarcer. Although it would conceivably take fewer administrators to run a ministry in which substantial decentralization and privatization of certain functions had taken place, it is not clear that the total amount of human capital (skill per person, as measured by training and experience, multiplied by number of people with those skill levels) would be at all lower than is the case today. More fundamentally, there is by no means an excess of ministers who understand, or have available to them technocrats who understand, why and how all these skills are related to each other, and what role they might play in a modernized system. Even as ministries invoke the mantras of performance-based pay, decentralization, privatization under contracts, etc., they lack the personnel and skills to carry out any of the sophisticated analytical tasks needed to make sure the proposed reforms do not become the flip side of the current failures.

4.3 Focus on the Dialogue or Communications Component

Our approach prioritizes dialogue, stakeholder learning, and communications, with data and analysis as strong supports. Because the data and EMIS aspects, and the analysis aspects, are relatively better known, we have dedicated more space to the dialogue components. Several aspects stand out.

4.3.1 Prioritizing the Demand Side

Table 1 above, within what we have referred to as the technical supply-side approach, suggests a natural flow (with regard to chronology, effort, and analytical precedence) from data to analysis to dialogue. We argue that it is sometimes possible to *start* with dialogue, in terms of both chronology and analytical precedence, as a way to stimulate demand for analytical tools, and to act as a healthy counterbalance against the tendency of technocrats to emphasize the supply orientation. In this scenario, sharply increased debate, based on simple facts jointly articulated in, say, a simple forecasting model, creates a demand for more facts. Part of the awareness-creation process may have to include heightening awareness of the need for change, because the system cannot go on as it has been. Both a need for change, and the ability to express that need in technocratically intelligible terms, are key to boosting the demand for data and analysis. Thus, the demand-side flow is as depicted in Table 1. We are proposing not to absolutely prioritize the demand side, but to prioritize it relatively, as a corrective, based on the situation. But how?

4.3.2 Breaking Low-level Information Equilibria

“Breaking equilibria,” to most people, sounds like a bad thing. However, in many cases, bad policy results from asymmetric information equilibria that trap public policy debate and discourse at a low informational or analytical level. Certain groups (teachers’ unions, university students, urban elites) have been able to steer public and private rents to themselves partly by controlling information, data, and rhetorical discourse.[6] Other groups (e.g., rural parents of primary schoolchildren) are not as able to present their case to the state, so they lose in the allocation of state resources. When the difference in informational power is enormous (where informational asymmetries are great), and the weaker groups have no realistic prospect of enhancing their rhetorical and informational power, a low-level equilibrium of informational forces exists. Decisions get made in a routine manner, and budget allocations are similar from year to year, because, for example, “everyone knows” that the university sector deserves 30% of the budget, that development requires a strong university, and that a strong university requires public funds. The assumptions remain unexamined. No data are used to either define or challenge these implicit policy positions. The inarticulate, the informationally disenfranchised, remain silent, and *their* assumptions and needs never become a matter of public discourse. University students are able to take on a mantle as the legitimate representatives of the people, as well as the guarantors of technological development, with almost no one being able to question the empirical base of these assumptions. A key public sector failure is the inability of the state to fulfill its role as an arbiter by injecting information into the public discourse, or by using information itself in making decisions.

Note that “the informationally disenfranchised” do not necessarily wholly coincide with “the poor.” Certainly, the poor are almost always informationally disenfranchised, which explains why they can so often be coopted by cynical manipulators of their need. But there are other groups in most societies in which we work that could be logical choices for “selective information arming.” For example, the ministry of education may be informationally weak relative to the ministry of finance. The progressive industrialists who need a skilled labor force with a good primary and secondary education, may be—almost always are—informationally and rhetorically disenfranchised relative to university professors. PTAs, NGOs, and other organizations in civil society are almost always informationally weak, even at the national level, where they represent their grassroots membership and so are not necessarily lacking in financial resources. Thus, there is not necessarily a correlation between lack of financial resources and lack of informational power. Sometimes it is simply a matter of lack of a technical or analytical tradition and institutional infrastructure.

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[6] We are not slighting the importance of other forms of political power. We are simply choosing to focus on forms of power related to information, including the informational aspects of mass demonstrations, riots, etc. It is not that we believe those other forms are unimportant, but that here we are concerned with what donors (or outside “interveners” in general) can do to challenge informational asymmetries. They have a much harder time working with other bases of power.

In short, one can bolster the demand side by focusing supply on certain groups, while helping focus the self-interest of other groups (e.g., industrialists who may want to try to capture export markets and thus need a more educated labor force) so that it coincides with the national interest, so as to break traditional informational equilibria. The broken equilibrium then leads to a burgeoning demand for information on all sides.

This task may be impossible, or at least much more difficult, in societies with no tradition of public debate at all. Thus, in a traditional, nontechnocratic military dictatorship, very little of what we are suggesting maybe possible. Similarly, in societies in which most issues are so emotional that technocratic debate is impossible, much of what we have said may also be inapplicable. In other situations, what we are proposing may be “good” in some abstract or naive sense, but it is likely to be perceived as unnecessary by the national leadership and by our counterparts. That is, they may argue that even though the political process is closed, the regime is fairly successful at reducing poverty and inducing widespread growth. Donors need to be very honest and careful about the range of situations in which either what we propose makes sense to us or our counterparts perceive it as needed. In Volume 5, *Strategy Development and Project Design*, we suggest ways to assess readiness and receptivity to these ideas.

There is a logical worry in all this. It may seem possible to simply unleash a cacophony of information that will lead nowhere. It also may seem that if various sides are more or less equally armed with information—or, rather, that if informational equilibria are broken—then the result may be paralysis, or movement in directions not in the long-term public interest. We think this is a misplaced concern, or a concern that can be addressed if the assistance is sufficiently adroit. Few private interests defend themselves in terms of that private interest. If, as we have pointed out above, the perversion of public policy away from efficiency and equity in many countries is so glaring, then adding more information to the public debate in a responsible manner cannot, it seems to us, lead to bad results, unless we are ourselves being dishonest. Vigorous, informed, guided discussion (not guided in the sense of being aimed at a predefined goal, but in the sense that the discussion has to have *a goal* and a means for discovering whether it is moving in some direction) will reveal policy to be skewed toward certain private interests and away from the public interest, and will make it easier for the state to take corrective action. We believe that a concern about “excessive” public debate often arises from a traditional technocratic view of the state as benevolent, independent, and efficient, and hence a view that public policy issues should be dealt with by the professionals in the state apparatus, who will make efficient decisions quickly in the name of the people, without getting bogged down in endless public debate. If the state were indeed benevolent, just, and efficient, then this point of view would be correct. But this assumption seems to us unjustified in the enormous majority of countries in Africa, given the short history and fragility of most democracies there, and the relative lack of somewhat “benevolent” and yet competent despotisms of the East Asian type.

In short, there is one aspect of the concern that does seem appropriate to us: that *unguided, random* discussion may indeed result in paralysis. Thus, a general concern about the danger of a public policy debate that is information-rich and extremely vigorous seems to us misplaced. However, if such debate is not only vigorous and information rich, but also chaotic and unguided, then we will still get nowhere. This leads us to the next point.

4.3.3 Dialogue as Dialectics Rather Than Talk

People will not somehow magically come to understandings just because of informed talk and debate. Mere talk, particularly if informed with more data, can indeed serve mostly to highlight differences. In this case, groups either revert to bromides, because they know that they will never come to an understanding about the fundamental issues that divide them; or they talk past each other. If there is good will, they may also opt for nondialectical compromises, for solutions of the “splitting the difference” or “least common denominator” variety. For example, if a society is divided between radical decentralizers, who want everything to be managed at the school level, and radical centralizers, who want everything managed at the central level, a non-dialectical solution would be to “split the difference” and opt for management at the provincial or municipal level. This common “solution” in fact is no solution at all, since most provinces in most countries are too big to promote personnel accountability seriously. A more sophisticated solution, which requires more information and analysis, would be to put certain functions at each place, or to put the same function in two places (i.e., some decentralized, some centralized), but to designate one for making the decision and the other for vetting it. In the case of managing the teaching profession, one often sees these kinds of non-solution or “split the difference” compromises. An alternative is illustrated in the hypothetical example in Box 3.

A typical "split the difference" solution for the situation in Box 3 would be to make teacher hiring and firing a provincial matter. How can reformers avoid these "talking past each other" nonsolutions?

First, the process must be guided by public interest groups. If the state is technically incapable or indeed too much in the thrall of particular groups (including its own bureaucracy as a private interest group), then the process must take place at least partially in civil society. It must be guided, however, by one or more NGOs or other "independent entities" that are perceived as strong defenders of the public interest, or that come as close as possible to this ideal. If such an entity does not exist, or an existing one cannot be oriented in this direction, then it is unlikely that efforts of this kind will work. In other documents (see Volume 5, *Strategy Development and Project Design*) we provide several checklists and procedures for assessing these issues.

Second, the dialogue process must use techniques and technologies that allow groups to begin to reach dialectical and negotiated conclusions, rather than just to air opinions (although in terms of chronology, airing opinions may have to come first). For this effect to occur, the dialogue process *must* refer to analysis, and must count on the advice of researchers and analysts. Defining efficient (dialectical or win-win, rather than "split the difference") compromises requires technical expertise in defining funding and management formulae that can bridge opposition by pointing out to groups that they are not on the trade-off curve[7]—but inside it—and as a result, trade-offs need not be made. But the process also requires specific dialogue-facilitation or negotiation skills, including knowledge of rules of order and parliamentary procedure. An important realization is that the aim of the dialogue is not 100% consensus, which is neither feasible nor necessary. Only consensus sufficient to define and make possible a reform project is needed.

Box 3. Avoiding "Split the Difference" Solutions

A teachers' union may have legitimate concerns about the decentralization of hiring and firing, whereas the association of mayors and the education leadership may believe that teachers would be more responsive if principals and PTAs could have some say in hiring and firing teachers. A solution might be the development of a national teaching corps that guarantees a certain—not excessively attractive—level of salary and tenure, with attractive salaries being possible only if one pleases a community. The communities might be able to fire a teacher for nonperformance, but the teacher would still get tenure and a minimum salary, *and* must find other employment within a certain amount of time. If more than, say, five communities fire the teacher, then the teacher loses tenure.

There are many different approaches to crafting efficient compromises. In this respect, we cannot better the literature on process facilitation that has been created by projects such as the aforementioned Implementing Policy Change project, which offers a great deal of practical advice on these matters.[8] There is also a broader literature on negotiation and compromise specific to the education sector (see, for example, Mampuru and Spoelstra 1994). Finally, promising approaches such as Fishkin's deliberative polling techniques can be adapted to the crafting of policy choices (Fishkin 1991, 1995). We can only recommend that any definition of project activity in this area take this literature seriously, use it, and share it with counterparts. We recommend, further, that the expertise embodied in the individuals associated with the IPC "network" and other similar ones be tapped for Education Reform Support activities.

4.4 Tools and Techniques for Communication of Policy Ideas

4.4.1 Background and General Discussion

Dissemination. Communication. Conscientization. Social marketing. Policy dialogue. Persuasion. Media campaigns to "explain" reform. All these terms refer to techniques that can be useful in furthering policy reform processes. However, a tremendous amount of confusion, and sometimes instinctive negative reaction, surrounds some of them. For many people, the truth should be self-evident, and should "sell" itself, and hence there is no need for marketing. The fact that some proposition needs to be marketed indicates to them that it cannot be true. For others, the bureaucracy should be in charge of discovering the "truth" and implementing it, and therefore there should be minimal need for dialogue and persuasion. Others find the notion of marketing and persuasion inherently distasteful, because it implies manipulation and misrepresentation. Finally, some believe that whereas selling may be useful and not inherently evil, nevertheless the noble aspects of reform support are analysis, design, and high-level technical compromise. Furthermore, they believe that the selling, while necessary, should be left entirely to some vaguely specified (and implicitly lower-order) "others."

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[7] Social scientists commonly use a simple graph to illustrate trade-offs between two factors, such as quality and access. For example, with the *x*-axis denoting access and the *y*-axis denoting quality—and assuming a fixed budget—the trade-off curve is the straight line that connects the points (x_0, y_{high}) with (x_{high}, y_0). Coordinates of various points on the curve demonstrate that raising access lowers quality, and vice versa. Preparing such a diagram allows policy makers to choose an option somewhere along the curve, and to view with suspicion proposals that are either inside or outside of those practical limits. Note that the curve also can be moved farther out—for example, by a substantial infusion of additional funds.

[8] See Brinkerhoff 1994, 1995; Brinkerhoff and Kulibaba 1994; Crosby 1992a, 1992b, 1992c, 1995; IPC 1995.

We believe that most of these opinions can be classified as one of two types of misperceptions. The first is everyday misunderstandings about the functions of information in markets (both economic markets and political markets). The second consists of a belief that when technicians underestimate the importance and status of the marketing function, it imperils the whole process of reform, particularly for implementation-intensive reforms such as those in the education sector. Moreover, even those who are sympathetic to the use of these techniques confuse "dissemination" with "advocacy," "social marketing" with "policy dialogue," etc. These confusions are dangerous because they can lead clients (e.g., donors defining activities to be implemented by an NGO, contractor, or government counterpart), to misspecify what they want, thus leading to misunderstanding, frustration, acrimony, and waste of funds, not to mention under-achievement of the reform goals. In what follows we hope to cast some light on all these issues.

First, we need to deal with the bogey that there is something either nefarious or mysterious about persuasion and rhetoric (in the classical Greek sense), or about the tools used to persuade, whether the process is called "marketing" or "advocacy" or "dialogue." Some educationists are beginning to use these terms in a positive light (see, e.g., Hanson 1992, Hanson and Henry 1993), but in most of the education community, particularly the international one, the notions of marketing and persuasion still appear somewhat distasteful, despite the fact that the distinction between persuasion and learning facilitation is quite subjective.

The most reasonable conclusions from the literature on these issues appear to be the following.[9] An increase in persuasive ability cannot be nefarious, on net, as long as there is relative equality in the opportunity to persuade, some agreement as to the rules of persuasion, and openness in both parties to the mutuality of that persuasion. It is true that these conditions cannot be assumed or assured ex post ante in most developing societies, and these conditions are never perfect in any society. However, we are defining the role of donor projects as (1) to create more open competition in the ability to persuade, and (2) to help develop the infrastructure and the rules of the game, so that this persuasion can be mutual and based on agreed-upon evidentiary and procedural rules. Furthermore, even if the conditions needed for persuasion and the ability to use information astutely to produce desirable results are not all present, this shortcoming is not a sufficiently strong reason to discard the enhanced use of persuasive tools. Take the example of a society in which informational and persuasive power is distributed unevenly. If this power continues to be distributed unevenly after an external agent's intervention, but that external agent increases the persuasive and informational power of the more disenfranchised groups in the manner we have suggested, it will have a more positive than negative impact on the informational content of the ideas that are discussed in the political marketplace. In a sense, all communication is meant to persuade, else why bother? The differences in the modes of communication are all a matter of intent and ability (see Bostrom 1983).

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[9] These conclusions are drawn, for example, from Dahl (1984), with his distinction between "rational" vs. "manipulative" persuasion; and McClosky (1994), with the argument that most economics—even "good" economics—uses and should use rhetoric and is more about persuasion than anything else. Other explanations of the uses of persuasion and marketing in the social sectors appear in Altman and Petkus (1994), Fine (1981), Healy (1990), and Mampuru and Spoelstra (1994), just to name a few.

Various forms and styles of persuasion normally are practiced in the policy process. In what follows we attempt to lay out a classification and explanation of the various approaches, as normally understood by both clients and practitioners. There are no hard definitions of any of these terms, but, for the sake of clarity, we must use some definitions that are at least relevant to our own writings in this series. We are particularly interested in the notions of "social marketing," "policy dialogue," and "policy advocacy," and also how they relate to an analytical or research base that gives them substance. The reader should refer again to Table 2 above, where we diagram the fit and overlap between the techniques we are discussing.

- "Social marketing" usually means the whole set of activities toward the lower end of the table: consumer and attitude surveys, research and analysis on the surveys, use of focus groups, and marketing using social advertising and mass media to relatively many people. We do not locate this type of activity specifically in Table 2.
- "Policy dialogue" usually means activities heavily concentrating on the upper half of column 3a (bi-directional communications oriented at relatively few people), but usually also stretching into column 2 (some analysis, although it is usually assumed this is done by someone else, i.e., some other node in the support system) and also 3b (marketing and advocacy, once a clear position has emerged, and depending on the role of the communicator).
- "Policy advocacy" usually means an activity placed at the top of column 3b (unidirectional communication oriented at relatively few people). Generally, it stretches backward into columns 3a (focus groups) and 2 (common sense, qualitative analysis, light quantitative analysis).
- "Policy analysis," as normally thought of and as normally practiced by donor projects, involves most of the activities in the upper part

of the “analysis” column (column 2), and sometimes includes some aspects of the upper part of the “data” column (column 1).

Naturally, there are many overlaps. For example, to the extent that social marketing is part of the process of designing a policy product, it may come to rely on analysis of a more traditionally policy-oriented nature, such as econometric analysis and budgeting.

Now that we have located the various activities in relation to each other and in relation to their technical content, we proceed as follows. First, we describe three of the techniques (social marketing, policy dialogue, and policy advocacy)[10] in some detail. Second, we lay out some suggested guidelines as to how donors and counterparts can use them to support change.

4.4.2 Social Marketing in Education Reform

Definition

Some of the worst confusion mentioned above surrounds the use of the term “social marketing.” In part, this is because there are many different definitions of social marketing. We use a simple and functional one: Social marketing uses many of the same techniques that commercial marketers and advertisers use to persuade and influence behavior change, but applies it to behaviors that are of interest and benefit to society, or that in some loose sense (rather than the rigorous public finance sense) can be considered public rather than private goods. It is used, for example, to promote social change among targeted groups of people. Andreason (1995) has defined it in the following manner:

> Social marketing is the adaptation of commercial marketing technologies to programs designed to influence the voluntary behavior of target audiences to improve their personal welfare and that of the society of which they are part. It does so by focusing on the marketplace and thus determines the best way to design programs, target efforts and deploy resources to gain acceptability for a wide range of social ideas. The elicited behavior change is always voluntary, never coerced and financial profit for personal gain is never the [ultimate] motivation for the social marketing effort. (p. 3).

Social marketing has much to do with shaping consensus, changing attitudes and behaviors, and creating new social norms. Its objectives are often accomplished slowly, much more slowly than in commercial marketing, where the objective is usually to get the product off the market shelf. However, compared to simply waiting for change to happen due to the “natural” evolution of behavior, social marketing can be perceived as being miraculously expeditious and logical in its ability to shape the ways individuals within a societal structure think, react, behave, and adapt. This is particularly evident when one considers that, through social marketing, one is often (1) asking people to replace behaviors that they perceive as interesting, fun, or otherwise individually fulfilling (e.g., taking drugs, smoking) with less interesting behaviors; (2) attempting to influence deeply held attitudes of vast numbers of people, to affect the way future generations and entire societies will survive, live, work, and even procreate; and (3) marketing intangible products that cannot be bought and consumed immediately.

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[10] We do not elaborate on policy analysis here, because it is not a communication technique.

One of the key aspects of marketing is the understanding and use of market segmentation. Social marketing divides “the public” into conceptually manageable groups of people with certain commonalities. These groups are referred to as target audience segments. In its most basic form, a target audience segment is a group of people with defined similar characteristics, such as age, sex, economic status, educational level, social status, number of children, profession, occupation, political power, or a combination of the above, which therefore might predispose them to understand a certain message if it is presented in a specific manner.

Social marketing is based on learning and behavior change theories that attempt to define the process by which people formulate attitudes, abandon old behaviors, adopt new ones, and eventually sustain behaviors over time. Much of its concerns and challenges center on the interaction and integration of minds, environment, energy, instincts, and needs. Behavior change is used to enhance the state of relative and self-perceived well-being of the individuals and their homogeneous affinity groups that constitute local communities, regions, and eventually, nations. It works on both the macro and micro levels within which an individual, the smallest unit that collectively defines a “society,” operates. This means that social marketing uses behavior change theory to work on the individual, but with the eventual goal of affecting the society in which the individual lives.

One of the most important concepts in marketing is the notion of creating beneficial exchange relationships with a target audience—helping people to understand that if they do something now, they will benefit by getting something better. In social marketing, as in commercial marketing, people do things in exchange for benefits they hope to receive. Using a condom now will help prevent AIDS later, recycling garbage now will prevent depletion of natural resources later, sending a child to school now will increase the child’s and family’s potential for higher income later. As McKee (1992) has put it: “Exchange is the central concept underlying marketing. It calls for the offering of value to someone in exchange for value” (p. 10).

The social marketing process calls for a behavioral research phase to find out what issues are important to a target audience, what the members of that audience find difficult about adopting the behavior being promoted, and what would make them feel more comfortable about changing their behavior. Qualitative and quantitative research is used to assess attitudes, values, beliefs, and other factors that influence opinion and behavior. This phase is important because it helps to ask questions of the target audience for determining the strategic marketing approach that will most likely result in the desired behavior change for that specific group of people. More importantly, it helps “design” a product that sells, rather than selling a product that already exists.

Schematically, the social marketing process includes the steps listed in Box 4. Although most of the steps are taken chronologically, and logically build upon each other, monitoring and evaluation and sustainability strategies should be continuously threaded through each phase of the process.

Two important misconceptions regarding social marketing should be cleared.

(1) Mass media campaigns. When development experts hear the phrase “social marketing,” many of them think of media campaigns, television and radio advertising, brochures, pamphlets, and banners. They think of family planning promotion programs and the advertising of condoms and birth control pills through mass media, including songs and puppet shows about family size. They think about campaigns to “sell” child health issues, such as oral rehydration therapy and breastfeeding. They visualize banners in the street urging mothers to immunize their children, bus

Box 4. Steps in Social Marketing

- **Market research and analysis**
  - Mission
  - Objectives
  - Situational analysis
  - Audience segmentation and market research
- **Design of intervention strategies**
  - Structure
  - Communication
  - Dissemination/delivery
  - Monitoring and evaluation
  - Sustainability strategies

placards about AIDS, television advertisements and radio programs asking adults to be monogamous and teenagers to abstain from sex. Yet, all these are only the social "advertising" part of communications, not the entire social marketing process. Social advertising is the visible, vocal culmination of the marketing plan. As the schematic list above suggests, it is at best a quarter of the social marketing process. In commercial marketing, advertising is used to *support* programs, not to replace them. Mass media campaigns can play a role in creating awareness and fostering knowledge. If done well, they can even affect attitudes. Alone, however, they rarely change behavior. It is important to understand exactly what is to be accomplished by using the media, and to whom the message is directed. Misusing and misdirecting media wastes time, energy, and money. The "true" process, as opposed to the superficial aspect of advertising, encompasses a market research phase, a cost-benefit analysis, and the development of an intervention strategy that includes the communication phase. It is prudent to remember that in this age of information overload, even in developing countries, specifically targeted innovative communications may take many forms—one of which may or may not use an intensive mass media campaign.

(2) Manipulation. An often-heard comment about social marketing is that it is manipulative and underhanded, an attitude that causes many people to close their minds to social marketing. We have already discussed this bogey above, in our reflections on persuasion. In the specific context of social marketing, McKee (1992) has remarked:

> The word manipulative usually connotes hidden or unfair ends and/or means used in the influence process. We argue that if a cause is marketed openly with the purpose of influencing someone to change his or her behavior, then the process is not manipulation, any more than is the activity of a lawyer, religious leader, or politician trying to convince others. If a social marketer simply makes the strongest possible case in favor of a cause without distorting the facts, the approach is not manipulative. Social marketing, especially when used in counter marketing, can provide a voice for those with competing points of view. (p. 27).

An injunction such as "if you smoke three packs of cigarettes a day, get ready to die young" can be persuasive without being manipulative, under two conditions. First, the attempt at persuasion must have the best interest of the receivers in mind (as perceived by the initiator of the persuasive effort, of course, since no one can ultimately determine what is in the best interest of someone else). In this case, the goal is improving their health. Second, it must not distort the facts, even if it presents them dramatically with the hope of impact. Of course, as with any technique, the ethics are tied to the user rather than to the technique itself. Finally, even when the persuasion *is* manipulative, many nonexperts hold a grossly exaggerated belief as to the power of persuasion to sell ideas or products that are not appealing to begin with. The limited power of persuasion is why, after all, marketing is more about good design than about sales.

4.4.3 Policy Dialogue

Policy dialogue is a less-developed concept than social marketing. It has normally been used to refer to high-level discussion between donors and counterparts in host countries, or discussions among host-country counterparts themselves, regarding policy issues. Usually, the term is used to denote very specific discussion of the issues, with an interest in promoting policy changes. In that sense, policy dialogue is usually taken to mean something more proactive than dissemination or discussion, and something more akin to mutual persuasion and advocacy. As opposed to “mere” discussion, it tries to be persuasive and argumentative, but as opposed to advocacy, it is intended to be mutual.

The term has often been used in contradistinction to policy conditionality. In that context, it has often been assumed that a donor has two polar forms of leverage over a host country, in attempting to help that country find its way to better policies: (1) to withhold funding until policy changes are made (also known as conditionality); or (2) to develop conviction, via sustained reasoning and persuasion, which has been called “policy dialogue.” The current use and practice of policy dialogue seem to have had at least two important “impulses”: (1) the practice of macroeconomic and other economic and sectoral discussions, as an adjunct or alternative to conditionality; and (2) the practice of “technified” advocacy as practiced by, for example, family planning advocates in high-level dialogue (as opposed to social marketing).

Dialogue and conditionality have been seen as alternatives or adjuncts to each other in inducing host country reform at least since the 1960s, when realization first began to set in among donors that simple technology transfer would not be enough to induce sectoral progress, particularly in the agricultural sector (see Goldsmith 1983). Since then, arguments about the merits of one over the other, and discussions about how to “do” dialogue, have been a common thread in the discussion of policy reform. It was realized, for example, that inappropriate policies blocking receptivity to and spread of technical transfer are caused not by ignorance or analytical mistakes, but by pressure from interest groups; and the cost of confronting those interest groups is frequently simply not worth the subsidy represented by the donor's transfer in a conditionality program. This means that the leverage must come more from "policy dialogue" than from policy conditionality: "The funds over which A.I.D. [donors] have discretion are limited. The ability to influence the policy of aid recipients must therefore come less from the leverage of conditionality and more from the power of persuasion" (Weintraub 1989, p. 7).

Many evaluations of various donors' policy work have given as much credit to policy dialogue as to other tools such as conditionality. Jafir, Eaton, and Sequeira (1989) claim that, in the case of the Dominican Republic, "The A.I.D. policy role has been the single most important influence in convincing the government to maintain stabilization policies in the face of tremendous odds... Five elements contributing to this success are... the size of the cash transfers, the timing of disbursements, the use of sanctions to enforce conditions precedent..., and effective policy dialogue." Other evaluators place even more emphasis on policy dialogue than on conditionality. In an evaluation of policy-based assistance in Honduras, a Center for Development Information and Evaluation (CDIE) (1989) evaluation concludes that "informal discussion, such as those held by the Joint Economic Working Group to promote changes in the tariff policy, can bring results in cases where conditionality and leverage do not work." Others, commenting on the same country, note that conditionality and dialogue were about equally important (Clarence Zuvekas, personal communication). With regard to Senegal, Berg and Associates (1990) go even further, in recommending that the Agency "eliminate past emphasis on conditionality in order to build up local ownership, [and] as far as possible separate assistance from policy dialogue." They base this recommendation on their assessment that "Senegalese officials view policy reforms with suspicion," and that the donors' drive to disburse led to a "large inflow of aid money [that] has created a no-sanctions environment that eroded political will to reform." In a comprehensive review of policy reform efforts at USAID, Pillsbury (1991) recommends, among other things, that effort be devoted to "refine A.I.D.'s strategy of incremental policy dialogue." Thus, there has been a lively discussion of these issues for several decades, but there has been little awareness and use of these conclusions in the education sector. This series represents the most systematic effort to think about the uses of policy dialogue and analysis-based persuasion in the education sector, that we know of.

Another important impulse behind the interest in policy dialogue as a spur to policy change appears to have been the successful use of high-level dialogue and advocacy techniques, particularly using appropriate communications and persuasion tools, such as computer models and computer graphics presentations. Many of these successes come from the family planning field, where the use of high-information-throughput communications techniques, similar to the boardroom marketing techniques used in the private sector, has become a rather elaborate art. USAID projects such as Resources for the Awareness of Population Impacts on Development (RAPID) and OPTIONS have refined this approach and, to some degree, codified it in useful forms (see, e.g., Murphy 1994). Transferring these techniques to the education sector, however, is not as straightforward a matter as some early attempts (e.g., the Basic Research and Implementation in DevelopinG Education Systems [BRIDGES] project) hoped. Some attempts have been made to use these techniques in education, starting with the BRIDGES project (see, e.g., Crouch, Spratt, and Cubeddu 1992), and later with the Advancing Basic Education and Literacy (ABEL) and Education and Human Resources Technical Services (EHRTS) projects (see Landauer 1995 on the Latin American Strategies for Education Reform [LASER] policy dialogue tool). During that time, principles and practices for applying these specific technologies to education policy dialogue were discovered and systematized.

From all these experiences, a set of lessons regarding the art of policy dialogue has emerged. In what follows we summarize these lessons only very briefly, because many of them are closely related to the overall approach of Education Reform Support, and thus have been covered elsewhere in our series. The apparent lessons from policy dialogue experience are laid out (in very telegraphic and bold fashion) in Box 5.

4.4.4 Policy Advocacy

The common-sense and dictionary definitions of advocacy are adequate for understanding the use of advocacy in educational policy. To advocate is to plead, to argue for, to propose, to appeal for people or for ideas. Normally, the concept's connotations and associations are

Box 5. Some Principles for Policy Dialogue

(1) Analysis and persuasion are both important. Most problems are not amenable to either alone. Policy mistakes usually are not analytical mistakes; ideology, group self-interest, opinion, habit, posturing, and politics all play a role; persuasion is therefore required. Persuasion, if unaccompanied by analysis, will backfire.

(2) The dialogue must be indigenous ("them-them") vs. donor-driven ("us-them"). It must also be endogenous (it must both set and react to internal policy agendas and breaking events). These are not ideological or ethical requirements consistent with "good" development. They are practical requirements. Both imply that local units must implement the dialogue.

(3) Both leadership and participation are needed in the dialogue. Participation without leadership will meander, will engage in "split the difference" solutions, and will propose common misperceptions as solutions (e.g., policy based on the "obvious" and highly popular "truth" that prices can be controlled). On the other hand, policy reform without participation, particularly in implementation-intensive sectors, is too difficult to design because the subtle and complex information needed for implementation is too difficult to obtain technocratically; and because small leadership groups will engage in self-validating group-think.

(4) The purpose and goals of the dialogue must be clear. Generally, it must not be aimed at simply "knowing each other better," even if that is the initial step. The reformist goals must be clear. Thus, dialogue must be conscious of the day's hot issues in the policy agenda.

(5) Pressure groups matter a great deal, in spite of the appearance of the state as an independent agent. Practitioners from developed countries fail to recognize lobbies and pressure groups in developing countries because they often have no name and no formal incorporation, or because they lobby via unconventional mechanisms, but they are often very powerful. Secondary and university student unions, and teachers' unions, are very powerful groups in many countries, in a variety of subtle ways. Policy dialogue that does not engage these groups likely will not accomplish much. The political economy of the situation must be understood and used, via formal techniques such as political mapping or via less formal techniques such as networking and explicit political strategizing.

(6) Because government is often in thrall to specific interest groups (e.g., parliament in many African countries is overwhelmingly populated by teachers and ex-teachers, and is not therefore likely to be a source of unbiased opinion and legislation regarding teacher salaries), the role of public interest, or at least countervailing forces in civil society, will be key. The development of policy-analytical and persuasive powers among these NGOs or foundations will be key.

(7) The process is slow and has a natural pace that is very difficult to hurry, particularly in countries where the institutions that propose the policies have to be strengthened at the same time as the policy debate is encouraged. A 5- to 10-year planning horizon on the part of donors funding these efforts is a minimum.

(1) that someone is advocating for someone else as their formally or informally, democratically or traditionally appointed agent; and (2) that it is a unidirectional flow of information whereby the persons who are the source of the information are already convinced of a certain point, or must act as if convinced, and are trying to convince someone else. When taken to the policy level, the implications are that the advocate is acting on someone else's behalf and pleading or petitioning for changes in policies that affect those he or she represents. Another implication is that those to whom the pleading is being directed have considerable power over those in whose favor the advocate is pleading. Thus, policy advocacy is almost by definition used to influence decision makers and relatively powerful role-players in society.

In general, advocacy is used for:

- Speaking up, drawing a community's attention to issues, creating awareness about a certain problem, directing decision makers to a solution.
- Putting problems on the policy agenda, supplying a solution to the problem, and building support and opinion favorable to the solution.

Advocacy can involve action toward short-term gains, or the build-up of opinion and sentiment toward a long-term solution. It can involve actors at all levels, but generally it is aimed at the decision makers within various levels, whose decisions affect the lives of others. In that sense, advocacy is generally aimed at decisions and issues of collective impact, however the collective is defined.

Advocates for education reform would use the same sorts of tools and strategies as are highlighted with regard to policy dialogue and social marketing: selecting issues, selecting allies and forming coalitions, delivering the message, developing presentations, etc.

4.4.5 Ideas for an Integrated Use of Various Techniques: Distinctions, Commonalities, and Borrowings

Background

In the past few years, program managers have heard the words social marketing, policy dialogue, communications, and advocacy used sometimes separately, sometimes interchangeably or synonymously. Confusion has reigned. Smith and Hornik (forthcoming) explain that:

> Important differences between marketing, communication and advocacy approaches should be understood. Marketers, for example, have traditionally been interested in the provision of consumer-oriented services and in the development of effective control strategies, and communicators in the promotion of effective messages. The growing complexity of social problems has fostered a growing specialization within each community. However, many of the specific program tools, such as awareness campaigns, advertising, demonstrations, segmentation of audiences, and consumer research are used by marketers, communicators and advocates alike.

In what follows, we first highlight some of the differences, then present commonalities and similarities, and then discuss important ways in which they can borrow from each other, as well as ways in which they could and should be used depending on the various needs and stages in processes of reform support.

Distinctions

This exercise may seem academic. After all, one might reason, perhaps this is all a matter of semantics, and as long as the techniques work and the experts presumably know what they are doing, why should anyone be bothered with definitions and distinctions? Worse, it might even seem counterproductive: why erect artificial walls between disciplines? The problem is that the development "business" is one with clients and patrons, principals and agents—and not one with all-knowing technocrats who implement every stage. If the designers of donor projects, those who pay for donor projects, and those who implement them as their surrogates (not to mention the ultimate clients and the counterparts), were all one and the same, there would indeed be no problem.

However, given the separation among donor staff, contractors and implementors, and host country counterparts in government and NGOs, it is clear that miscommunication will undoubtedly arise, and will inevitably lead to very costly mistakes, unless everyone is as clear as possible about what they want and what they mean. For example, suppose one did not, after all, want a mass advertising campaign based on serious marketing research (which might even be totally counterproductive at an early stage of the process), but instead wanted some high-level policy dialogue based on limited focus-group and simulation modeling research. Making this discovery by trial and error is an extremely expensive form of experiential learning for everyone involved. Thus, we believe it is important to point out some distinctions before going on to explain some commonalities, some areas where the various disciplines can learn from each other, and then some integrated uses. We emphasize that in highlighting these distinctions we use the more common understandings of these disciplines.

The distinctions among the disciplines owe mostly to their origins and their uses as they have evolved. For example, social marketing originates and borrows from commercial mass marketing research, product design, and advertising in industrial societies; whereas policy dialogue grew out of policy analysis, policy discussion, and negotiation, and uses boardroom techniques of persuasion in developing countries. Table 3 highlights key distinctions.

Similarities

Table 3 highlights differences, but also points out many similarities. Some of the key areas where the disciplines overlap, are similar, or can usefully borrow from each other, include the following:

(1) All can be—or eventually lead to—some kind of sales or persuasion. All use rhetorical tools. All are concerned with the use of information to change people's minds.

(2) All use, or should use, some type of market segmentation analysis to tailor-make their messages to particular audiences, as a way of maximizing communication by tethering the message to the interlocutor's context, age, or experience. Because of its tradition, and because it is less well-defined as a marketing technique, policy dialogue has made much less use of market segmentation analysis. The relevant use of market segmentation analysis in policy dialogue is more akin to political mapping than to traditional market segmentation. (See Volume 5, *Strategy Development and Project Design*, on using market segmentation in policy dialogue).

(3) All use similar types of information. All should be based on solid, accurate information. Relying on inaccurate information will often backfire. Transmitting inaccurate information, e.g., in advocacy, will backfire more when there is equal opportunity of persuasion and an organized marketplace for ideas—that is, when there is true debate.

(4) In the past, neither advocacy nor policy dialogue has been associated with the use of techniques to reach the masses. This is not a fault, since their practitioners did not make this their aim. But, clearly, leaders who support reform processes need to use techniques that gather mass "consumer-like" information, (so that they can better understand (1) the limits of policy implementation, (2) concerns at the local level, (3) purchasing power and willingness to pay, etc. They also need to use "advertising-like" information channels, either to help mobilize public opinion in favor of particular policies, or to explain policy decisions once they are made. ERS should avail itself of the traditional power of social marketing in these areas, as well as continuing to use quantitative sources more familiar to policy analysts, such as EMIS, socioeconomic surveys, and so forth.

Below we explore some of these overlaps and borrowings a bit more, by proposing some integrated uses of these three techniques.

Table 3. Some Distinctions Among Social Marketing, Policy Dialogue, and Policy Advocacy

Issue	Social marketing	Policy dialogue	Advocacy
Intellectual or academic traditions, background	Marketing, business administration, behavioral psychology.	Policy analysis, economics, political economy.	Negotiation, mobilization, lobbying. (Academic traditions not as important or as clear as for other disciplines)
Traditional concerns	Individual behavior as affected by individual perception and motivation; what people do in everyday situations; people making purchases, exchanges, and decisions for themselves.	Collective behavior as affected by negotiation, compromise, explicit cost-benefit analysis, power relations; collective behavior as true public behavior rather than the aggregation of individual behavior.	Collective behavior, as in policy dialogue. Oriented more at pleading than at compromise and more at one-way than at two-way information.
Audience and method of reaching it	Generally large, and reached through mass media and repeatable performances.	Small groups, and small numbers of groups of interlocutors. One-on-one and one-on-few; boardroom techniques.	Similar to policy dialogue, but may include less high-level technique.
Related and supporting disciplines	Psychology, statistical analysis, product design, sales, mass advertising techniques/technology.	Political economy, public policy analysis, economic analysis via budgets and simulations, statistics. Boardroom sales, negotiation, and discussion techniques.	Usually leaves deeper policy analysis to others. Uses largely secondary analysis. Analysis may focus on coalition strategies and other political aspects. Marketing techniques are similar to those used with policy dialogue.
Methodologies of data gathering	Surveys, focus groups, case studies.	Surveys, corporate (public or private) MIS and budget, censuses, case studies, etc.	Usually leaves major data gathering to others. Uses largely secondary data.
Messages	Relatively unambiguous, action-oriented.	Relatively ambiguous, situationally dependent during the negotiation stage. Depends on stage of policy design or type of policy, but is almost never as unambiguous as in social marketing.	Relatively unambiguous, as in social marketing.
Current status as a discipline	Highly developed and elaborated.	Not very developed or elaborated.	Somewhat developed and elaborated.
Degree of involvement of the practitioner	Can be objective and uninvolved. Can design products more or less objectively. The presence of the practitioner itself does not become data.	Difficult to remain objective and uninvolved: The practitioner becomes part of the reality to be changed.	Impossible for practitioner to be uninvolved, by definition.

Integration: Stages in the Policy Process

To better understand the proposed integrated uses, it is useful to think in terms of stages in policy reforms. The notion that the policy process takes place in stages is an old one. In our ERS approach we use an adaptation of the model proposed in Porter (1995). That is, we believe it is possible to think of stages only to the extent that different "aspects" of the process necessitate different types of support or intervention from those supporting and moving the process along. We concur with the model in that the process of policy formation and implementation is actually much messier and less linear than was normally (in the past) proposed in the academic literature, with the stages not being sequential at all, but instead being simultaneous and iterative. With that in mind, we propose the following schematization (see Table 4).

To further elaborate the integrated use of these techniques, we describe some of the key stages. (refer to Table 4).

Demand creation. The two first stages (which can also be called "reform demand creation and expression") use all three techniques in different ways. Among the least familiar are: (1) creating awareness among social leadership that there is a problem to be resolved; (2) moving important decision makers to free up the budgetary and human resources, as well as the social energy needed to do serious research, analysis, and marketing during the following stages; (3) framing the issues very specifically and with the weight of public opinion; and (4) getting decision makers and power brokers to create unthreatening spaces for serious, hard-hitting dialogue to continue.

Social marketing in these phases can be used to collect qualitative information about each audience segment's perceptions and misconceptions, desires, needs, fears, and potential for support or opposition to changes in the education system. Once all the barriers to change and the possible benefits are analyzed *from the perspective of each specific audience,* the results can be used to develop appropriate rationales, arguments, and information to help convince the targets of the need for reform and how it helps them achieve their personal or professional goals. These arguments then can be used within traditional policy dialogue. As Haddad and Demsky (1994) put it: "Policy marketing, therefore, involves balancing a number of contradictory demands, and soliciting support, or at least tolerance, from the many different segments of society which have an interest in education."

Table 4. Uses of Social Marketing, Policy Dialogue, and Policy Advocacy in Stages of the Policy Process

	Uses		
Stage	**Social marketing**	**Policy dialogue**	**Advocacy**
Demand Creation 1. Creating general high-level awareness (this stage is often necessary to legitimate the exercise and to free up the funding and social energy needed for subsequent stages)			Use to create awareness at high levels. (Sample topics: school quality and enrollment failing, schools not responsive to communities.)
2. Putting issues on the agenda	Use to help determine, target, coalesce, and channel sense of desire for change from bottom up. (Sample issue: community attitude and perceptions of school's responsiveness.)	Use to help decision makers understand and define the needed directions of change (e.g., discuss issues of decentralization in broad and informative ways).	Use to help expand and communicate needed sense of change to wider circle of opinion makers (e.g., explain to wider groups that change is needed to make schools more responsive to communities).
Considering the Public's Needs First 3. Determining policy options; beginning to generate core consensus	Use to determine implementability of various options; measure against consumer or public awareness (e.g., assess willingness and abilities needed for school board or PTA management; assess what exists already, what could exist with training).	Use to debate and discuss the options, present and sell the better ideas, and narrow them down (e.g., debate specific decentralization options, then begin to select a few, and sell those more energetically; examine trade-offs).	
Influencing Policy Implementation 4. Expand core consensus		Use to "sell" narrowing set of options to wider circle (that is, sell the narrowed-down options more energetically, but still debate them). Note that as options narrow, circle of decision makers and opinion makers widens.	Use to "sell" specific options to wider circles of opinion makers and implementors. (Begin to sell one or two options without much two-way interaction.)
5. Begin implementation	Use to explain and "sell" the decisions. Also, use to train and elicit behaviors consistent with the policies (e.g., encourage more PTA participation and train in needed skills and attitudes).	Continue reinforcing and refining via debate and options analysis, since nothing works well immediately.	Continue "selling" to high-level implementors and decision makers.

Considering the public's needs first. The third stage can use social marketing techniques to avoid some of the most egregious mistakes in policy reform. One of the most important sources of failure of past policy reforms in education in Africa has been the lack of attention to, or recognition of, inherent limits to their implementability (Craig 1990, Psacharopoulos 1990), and a related failure to address the demand side of the schooling equation (Fass 1995a, 1995b). The two are related (at least in complex, heterogenous, loosely coupled societies and bureaucracies), in that implementability has a great deal to do with the ability of the system to effectively harness and manage local public and private energy, and this harnessing, in turn, has a great deal to do with the demand for education, and for different types of education. By definition, people will not spend energy and money on something for which they have no effective, real demand. Therefore, requiring people who are not demanding certain education policies to implement them anyway, will obviously fail. Note the difference between real demand for the type of education that might make collective sense locally, and notional demand for a "free" education that can get one's children a job in the bureaucracy. (That is, many of us may express a high notional demand for, say, a Porsche, particularly if it is "free" or if it is paid for by the government; but few of us have any effective demand for one.)

The use of social marketing is key during the early-middle stages of policy formation. (So is the more traditional socioeconomic analysis; but social marketing, with its more businesslike consumer orientation, is more appropriate.) A necessary step in the assessment process, therefore, is to determine the impact on the ultimate implementors of what they are being asked to do. For example, would they benefit from the policy, and if so, how? Would they perceive those benefits to be immediate or long term? Would the costs be immediate or long term? Might they feel threatened? How much effort would it take for them to do what the policy is asking them to do? Do they perceive the benefits of what is being advocated to be worth the effort they will have to put in to attain the rewards? Are there any political costs involved? If so, what are they? What is the evidence regarding *true* awareness and willingness to pay costs (i.e., pecuniary, psychological, organizational, individual, and collective costs) in exchange for rewards, vs. the *notional or expressed* willingness?

It is impossible for anyone but the stakeholders to answer these questions. Furthermore, having stakeholders answer these questions in surveys is only minimally useful. It is better to employ sophisticated means of assessing demand that integrate continuous demand assessment into the implementation process (e.g., by decentralizing many decisions). Haddad and Demsky (1994) attribute tragic policy failures not only to the inability or lack of effort deployed to answer these kinds of questions, but also to the (apparent) belief that they are not important. Social marketing, using the techniques described here (and supplemented by traditional socioeconomic analysis), particularly in the vital design stage, can help reformers design a product that will sell, as opposed to trying to sell a policy product for which there is no effective demand.

Influencing policy implementation. The fourth and fifth stages—expanding the core consensus and beginning implementation—are the ones requiring the least explanation because they are, sadly, the ones already most familiar. In fact, the processes we associate with these stages are the only ones that ministry officials normally think of regarding the need for organized communications and persuasion: social advertising, media campaigns and public relations, all used in attempts to influence the implementation of un-implementable ideas (e.g., decentralizing costs and centralizing benefits, and trying to get communities to take responsibility for liabilities rather than for assets). As we have pointed out, many reforms fail because no one considered all the prior stages. Such lack of consideration arises out of an implicit belief that the problems are simple and that one must simply "plan," coupled with a belief in the bureaucracy's omniscience, analytical acumen, and implementation omnipotence. In short, the utility of these fourth and fifth stages, and the uses of social marketing, policy dialogue, and advocacy in these stages, are clear. But applying these techniques in these stages will be futile without the preceding stages.

Policy makers, particularly in education, and particularly in Africa, assume that public behaviors can be changed to fit the policy that has been developed, regardless of inherent environmental, economic, and political realities. Thus, when "planning," many leaders assume that they can simply write down their plan, pass a law that embodies the plan, allocate some budget funds, and then wait for things to happen. In other words, they develop policies and plans assuming that they can be marketed *without determining whether a market exists*.

Even in the fourth and fifth stages, however, and even assuming something serious has been done about the prior stages, communication campaigns are often naive to the point of being meaningless. For starters, campaigns that use mass communication techniques are a waste of money if the education policies they tout are not first *translated* into specific actions and behaviors that people can follow.

Use of the media, specifically radio, newspapers, and sparsely worded posters, can raise community awareness about the existence of a policy and its implications. To engender a positive attitude and belief that it is worthwhile for people to support the policy, other strategies have to be used; mass media are unlikely to do the job. For example, in a decentralization process that entitles communities to greater control over the education process, but also requires them to assume greater responsibilities, support for the change may be needed from community and religious leaders. By addressing these leaders as secondary audiences, reform proponents can use the leaders' support to "effect greater community" participation in policy implementation. The secondary audience can usually be reached through one-on-one meetings or small group meetings.

4.5 Networking and Institutional Development

As tools or techniques for supporting education reform, *networking* and *institutional development* are pivotal; and as distinct as they might appear to be, there are some very close associations between them. The ensuing discussion focuses first on networking and its potential as a tool, or technique, to support education reform. This discourse ends with an account of how networking can, in some instances, be an aspect of institutional development—a segue into our colloquy on the centrality of certain institutions to ERS and the importance of institutional development to sustained sector-wide reform.

4.5.1 Networking

Networking among key players is not commonly regarded as a tool or technique for supporting education reform. Yet it is well accepted in other realms as a means of gathering and disseminating strategic information to safeguard or improve relative professional, social, or political-economic stations in life. These applications point to the practical utility of networking regarding education reform support. For this purpose, networking consists of establishing, maintaining, and using (i.e., communicating with) relevant and strategic contacts within the education reform arena. It has the potential to fuel the reform process with useful and often strategic information regarding (1) key issues related to education reform, (2) stakeholders' interests, (3) proposed tactics, (4) political-economic developments, and (5) a whole host of sociocultural opinions, moods, and inclinations. All are critical and bear directly on the implementation of ERS.

In addition, networking enhances the initiators' capacity to further the dialogue process. In this regard, it is worthy to note that the dialogue can be furthered in two distinct ways. On the one hand, it can be extended to more people. If increasing numbers of actors within the education sector network and hold dialogue over issues of key importance to reform, the process opens up to even more stakeholders, the result of which is an enhanced policy environment. Observe that we are not talking exclusively about a single person's, or group of persons', network. People in one network usually are also members of other networks which, in turn, can be used to gather and disseminate information, initiate dialogue, etc. Under such purposeful, progressive networking, a dialogue process that is furthered by one, is furthered all the more by many.

On the other hand, constantly expanding the circle of diverse stakeholders who are in dialogue ensures that the views and opinions of others become known and shared—with two main results. The first is that people come to speak the same language; they approach a common understanding of what the key issues and constraints to the system are, and they better understand the overall nature and character of the educational situation of which they are but a small part (Healey 1994a, 1994b). The second is that the content and nature of the dialogue slowly evolves over time as stakeholders' views become incorporated. As a result, ensuing discussions become progressively more informed, relevant, and rich. It is the policy equivalent of market information in economics, and just as informational symmetry and richness are needed to make markets efficient, so they are needed to make policy design efficient and implementable.

To effect policy change, good information and targeted arguments[11] often have to be supported by a political-economic power base. As Weiss (1995) has observed and as we have echoed throughout this series, information alone is often inadequate to change policy. In this regard, coalitions are extremely important, and coalition building—a by-product of networking—is crucial. The point is that in many situations, the political-economic costs are simply far too great for a single decision maker to change a policy, even when presented with an arsenal of facts that suggest that change is both necessary and beneficial. In these instances, the political-economic pressure that causes the decision maker not to effect change has to be replaced by counterpressure that either raises the cost of not doing anything, or reduces the cost of the suggested change by isolating certain groups. Both can be done by building a powerful coalition that supports the desired change. The mobilization of popular opposition to university student demands for increasing subsidization in Mali is a prime example of how the cost to decision makers of imposing criteria for scholarships was lowered.

Finally, networking is instrumental in the development of a reform support infrastructure (see Volume 3, *A Framework for Making it Happen*). Through the networking of a core group, key actors within the education sector (i.e., NGOs, school committees, change agents, policy think-tanks, planning units) can be brought together as an RSI. Initially, the core group convinces these actors to buy into the ERS approach; over time, they persuade them to become constituent members of the infrastructure. In this way, the reform support infrastructure not only coalesces, but also functions as a single entity through continued networking. Networking thereby becomes a means of institutional development.

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[11] As an example of a targeted argument, one might argue to a supplier of primary school textbooks: "As you can see from the data, it is in your best interest to support reductions of government spending at the tertiary level."

4.5.2 Institutional Development

One cornerstone of the ERS construct is the notion that reform is an ongoing phenomenon. Another is the idea that purposeful and thoughtful reform has to be facilitated.

That reform should be regarded as an ongoing phenomenon emanates from the following realities: (1) change is constant; (2) knowledge is imperfect, particularly when acquired through bureaucratic *and* nonscientific means; (3) the reform environment is uncertain and complex; (4) reform is mutable; and (5) people's needs and aspirations evolve over time. Because reform is ongoing, efforts to effect it need to be sustained over time. Lest change lead to yet another ossified and entrenched system, demand for change has to be generated on a near-continuous basis. New issues will arise that require dialogue to become part of the very fabric of the education sector. These and other efforts at reform need to be sustained, which suggests strongly that they should, ultimately, be institutionalized.

This point about institutionalization leads to our second notion, that purposeful reform needs to be facilitated. Needed are institutions that will enable and facilitate ongoing reform. These institutions fall under three broad, though not totally distinct, headings: institutions that create and maintain the enabling environment within which ongoing reform can happen, those that can facilitate an orderly progression of representative (or participatory) change, and those that support both change and educational processes.

Creation and Maintenance of an Enabling Environment for Reform

Not all institutions are organizations, nor for that matter are all organizations institutions.[12] Some institutions are laws, regulations, statutes, policies, contractual arrangements, and principles, which in the case of an education sector, help to define both the character and nature of the system itself. For example, an education system is centralized not just because of the organizational and administrative dominance of the central ministry, but because of the host of laws and regulations that legitimize and entrench decision-making authority within the ministry as well. Needed, in addition to the reform support infrastructure, then, are nonorganizational institutions that will enable the vision of reform implicit to ERS. Specifically, statutes must be written to devolve decision-making authority to the point of implementation. Bureaucratic regulations have to be rewritten to decentralize offices and departments within the ministry. Standards have to be established that, on the one hand, will ensure both nation-building and uniform academic performance requirements throughout the system, but on the other hand, will provide the space needed for schools to set their own course for how those requirements are met. And teachers' contracts should ideally be renegotiated to allow schools to have the final word on who teaches there.[13] The point is that new, nonorganizational institutions can help to create the enabling environment within which reform can take seed and blossom.

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[12] See the institutional development literature for a discourse on what constitutes both an organization and an institution, especially Esman and Uphoff (1984), and Uphoff (1986).

Facilitation of Orderly Reform

When we speak of institutions that can facilitate the orderly progression of representative change, we have in mind democratic institutions. In much the same way as parliaments and national congresses are institutions designed to facilitate the orderly progression of representative change, school committees and district-level school boards have the potential to do the same. Education reformers' search for the "one best education system" has been futile and shortsighted (Brown 1993, Finn 1991, Gardener 1991, Wilson and Daviss 1994). We posit that the ultimate wisdom of education reform lies in the development of institutions that will allow communities not only to come up with their own education reform answers, but also to do so regularly or continually. Democratically structured school committees, local education boards, district school councils, and regional education commissions provide local-level stakeholders with the opportunity to deliberate over the nature and means of education, to choose among alternate reform initiatives, to collectively reflect over the impact change is having on their children's learning, and to effect further deliberative change if or when various factors warrant it.

Obvious, but still noteworthy, is the fact that democratic institutions also allow for broad participation in the reform process. Everyone from parents and teachers to directors and ministers has the opportunity (either directly or through elected representatives) to express a view, to counter the views of others, and to lobby for change. Out of such broad-based participation, a number of benefits potentially derive. One is widespread ownership of both the process and the answers flowing out of the process, which improves the chances of successful implementation. (See earlier argument in this volume on good design vs. implementation.) Another is the overall milieu that broad-based participation engenders. When people get involved in a process, they care about it, and this concern for education reform has enormous spillover effects into the culture of learning that is so critical to effective education (Reynolds and Cuttence, 1992). Broad-based participation also forges partnerships that bring to the reform process energies, capacities, and resources beyond those of the state.

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[13] This is not to say that school committees should have the authority to hire or fire teachers. Such decisions might be left to a centralized Teachers Service Commission. But if a school does not want to hire a particular teacher, for example, it should have the authority to hire another in that person's place.

Institutions, be they democratic or not, are important for the role they play in empowering people generally. Unorganized parents cannot effectively advocate for change. Unorganized schools (e.g., rural schools) cannot lobby for more resources. The point is that actors have to be organized to be able to make demands on the larger system. Rural schools, for example, are usually left to wallow in relative isolation, whereas urban schools, due to their proximity to the ministry and their ability to organize (via more highly skilled personnel and lower transactions costs), not only can make more effective demands on the system, but also can access more of the resources they need to operate.

Supporting Both Change and Education

Then there are the institutions that support both change and educational processes. We made the point earlier that reform needs to be facilitated. In this regard, we speak to the need for institutions that can support change processes. Data need to be managed and analyzed, demand has to be generated, endogenous answers have to be obtained, democratic institutions have to be built, dialogue needs to be informed and facilitated, and sector-wide learning has to be facilitated. This being the case, institutions should be developed that will undertake these activities. Educational processes need to be supported as well. Teachers' skills need to be continuously upgraded. Principals and school committees need to be trained and apprised of the newest school management techniques. Inspectors have to acquire skills in constructive evaluation and assessment. Curriculum centers need to be upgraded and periodically informed of innovations. Again, if reform is to be sustained, institutions will have to provide the technical support to make it happen.

The fact is that many of these institutions already exist. There are two problems, however: (1) not all of them exist, and (2) those that do exist rarely work together toward ongoing reform. Needed is a reform support infrastructure that can provide *all* of the necessary support services to make learning-driven, ongoing reform a reality. The exact nature of the infrastructure is expounded elsewhere in this series (see

Volume 5, *A Framework for Making it Happen*). Here we only note that it should be seen as a tool, and its development a technique, that can support education reform.

Section 5

Conclusion

Although we have elected to call this volume *Tools and Techniques*, we have never intended to present Education Reform Support as a mechanistic application of predefined sets of skills. In fact, we have labored extensively in this volume and the others to de-emphasize the mechanics of the approach and to stress its strategic nature. As stated at the outset of this volume, we do not believe we have invented any new tools or techniques. The strength of ERS is not in devising some novelty. Its contribution is in providing a framework for applying existing tools in new ways, in new combinations, and with new insight.

The education sector in most developing countries remains a bastion of overly centralized planning and pseudo-technocratic tinkering. Enormous amounts of financial resource have been poured into statistics, information, planning, and even “mobilization, media campaigns, and dialogue” for “capacity building.” Producing annual statistics; estimating how many teachers, desks, or books are needed to meet growing enrollment; and handling routine management of the budget cycle do not require overly complicated tools or techniques. Nor do mass media campaigns in the way that most ministries pursue them (they put out messages exhorting parents to send their children to school). Still, even this easier set of techniques is not well applied in most developing countries. Worse, virtually absent are the more complicated skills for nonroutine management challenges (financing formulae for equitable allocation of funds, cost-effectiveness analysis of policy options, merit-related personnel incentives, social marketing research, market segmentation, and true dialogue facilitation).

Our framework demonstrates how assistance efforts in the usual areas can overcome the obstacles that have squandered so many capacity-building resources for so little impact. It also encourages donors to introduce a set of tools and techniques that they may never have applied before to the arena of education policy and sectoral management. This volume of the Education Reform Support series has devoted considerable space to two conceptual areas—systematization and policy communication—because we think they are the keys to addressing the problems just raised.

Systematization is a multifaceted strategy that works on several aspects of ERS in combination and systematically. This approach contrasts with many policy support efforts that have sought to add policy units with analytical skills to ministries. We see analytical skills as just one element of a strategy that also develops marketing research and policy communication skills inside and outside the ministry, develops informational and analytical skills in a number of stakeholders, and actively networks these institutions with varying skills into what we call a reform support infrastructure.

Policy communication as we have described it here covers the range of communication settings and techniques from dialogue, to policy marketing, to mass marketing, to negotiation, to advocacy. One of the main purposes of building these communication skills is to generate demand for reform, and for better, more applied analysis. It also involves stakeholders and includes their input up front in the policy process so that policies can be crafted with greater attention to how they will be implemented.

Volume 5, *Strategy Development and Project Design*, provides a framework and a set of processes for actually identifying and designing Education Reform Support activities, projects, or programs that use the tools described in this volume.

Documents in the ERS Series

The Education Reform Support (ERS) series of documents presents an integrated approach to supporting education reform efforts in developing countries, with particular emphasis on Africa. It is designed for development agencies and for individuals interested in helping strategic elements within a host country steer events toward sustainable reforms in education, as well as for host country reform proponents who wish to understand the aims and means of agencies that propose activities in this area.

The six main volumes in the series are:

Volume Number	Title
1	*Overview and Bibliography*
2	*Foundations of the Approach*
3	*A Framework for Making It Happen*
4	*Tools and Techniques*
5	*Strategy Development and Project Design*
6	*Evaluating Education Reform Support*

There are also three supplementary documents:

- *Policy Issues in Education Reform in Africa*
- *Education Management Information Systems (EMIS) for Accountability*
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The series also includes an ERS Course Description, which consists of materials for teaching topics related to Education Reform Support.

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